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IN THE SUPRE,ME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
LESTER A. JONES, d/b/a ENGINE
& AIR SERVICE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

Case No. 8709

0. C. ALLEN, d/b/a 0. C. ALLEN
COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiff and respondent, Lester A. Jones, is unable
to accept as f.air, accurate and complete the statement of
facts set forth in the brief of the defendant and appellant
and will therefore restate said facts as plaintiff and
respondent views the same.
Throughout this brief the parties will be referred to
as in the Trial Court; plaintiff and respondent being
referred to as plaintiff; defendant and appellant as
defendant. All italics are ours.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appeal of defendant is fron1 judgment of the
Trial Court which was entered after the jury had returned a special verdict. The special verdict contained
six groups of propositions. Based on the special verdict
a judg1nent was entered in plaintiffs favor and against

defendant.
Group one presented to the jury the follo-wing two
propositions:
"Proposition (a) The defendant sold to plaintiff two barrels of oil other than 200 Kendall SAE
140.
"PropositioD (b) The oil sold to plaintiff in
1955 was 200 Kendall SAE 140."
The jury answered the proposition (a) in the affir1native.
There is no dispute that the defendant intenC.ed to
deliver l(endall 200 SAE 1±0 gear lubricant. The

e:~hibits

D ant110 show the intended order and the representations
h:~ the 0. C. Allen Company concerning what was being
delivered.
~l,lwrc

doe8 not sec1n to be any

·what all parties to the hro

~all'~.

serion~

disputes but

one on the 6th of X ovem-

her, 1!l!lG and the other one on the 14th of December,
1!l:lG, intended thl' oil sold and rcet'in'd to be 200 Kendall
SA 1~} l·t-0 oil.
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The evidence concerning the kind of oil which was
actually delivered by defendant to plaintiff is disputed
but evidence w.as presented which is of a substantial
nature and which directly supports the jury's answer to
proposition (a). 1\Ir. George Petty was sworn and testified as an expert and tested a part of the oil delivered
to plaintiff. His testirnony is that the oil delivered was
the equivalent of SAE 40 rather than 140. In addition
to the evidence of Petty Exhibit 11 shows that the test
done on the oil by Kendall Refining Company at the
request of the defendant revealed that the sample sent
was not representative of 200 Kendall SAE 140 oil. See
Exhibit 11 and (R. 15).
Group two of the interrogatories submitted two
propositions to the jury to detennine. The propositions
were as follows :
"Proposition (a) The plaintiff used the said
oil in the two trucks referred to as R 190 and R
191 in reliance on the representation of the defendant that it was 200 Kendall SAE 140.
"Proposition (b) The plaintiff used the said
oil in the said trucks without reliance on the defendant's representations that it was 200 Kendall
SAE 140."
The jury answered the proposition (a) in the affirm.a tive.
In addition to the representations appearing on the
oil barrel itself and those made by the delivery tickets,
at the time the oil was delivered the driver of the defendant's oil delivery truck specifically represented that
this was 200 Kendall SAE 140 oil, (R 40).
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Group 3 of the interrogatories presented two propositions which read as follows :
"Proposition (a) The use of said oil caused
damage to the said trucks.
"Proposition (b) The said oil did not cause
any dmnage to the said truck."
Again the jury answered the proposition (a) 1n the
affirmative.
The evidence concerning the damage to the truck
indicated that the first two trucks in which the oil furnished by defendant was used were placed on the job;
that both of said trucks were damaged. As soon as
damage was discovered the other trucks in which the oil
was used were brought in immediately and a new supply
of oil placed in said truck. In addition to the evidence
showing the damage to the trucks the plaintiff testifying
as an expert and experienced repair man described the
kind of da1nage as damage resulting from failure of the
lubricant whieh had been placed in the gear mechanisms
of the trucks (R. 48-49).
Group 4 of the speeial verdict presented two propositions for the jtu~· to eonsider. They read as follows:
"Proposition (a) Under all of the eonditions
the sale and purchase of the said
oil, an ordinary, prudent truek repairman would
not havp relied on the said oil as being 200 Kendall SAE 140.
~·mrrounding
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''Proposition (b) Under all of the conditions
surrounding the sale and purchase of the said oil,
an ordinary prudent truck repairman would have
relied on the said oil as being 200 Kendall SAl:~
140."
The

jlu~·

answered group -l

proposition~

as proposition

(b) in the affirn1ative.
The pleadings in the t·a~e show that the defendant
denied that the oil delivered wa::; not l(endall :200 ~~.AE
140 gear lubricant. The answer further denied that the
plaintiff relied upon the warranties and representations
b~· defendant that the oil delivered was Kendall :ZOO SAE
140. K o amendment to the answer was ever made but
at the time of the request for instructions submitted by
the defendant he requested an instn1etion numbered No.3
shown on page 151 of the record. It requested the Court
to instruct the jury that if the plaintiff examined the oil
or lubricant delivered to him and from such examination
he determined or should have determined that the oil or
lubricant was not the type that he had ordered then there
is no implied warranty and a verdict should be in favor
of defendant and against plaintiff for no cause of action.
At no place in the pleadings or in the instructions
did the defendant squarely present the defense that plaintiff was contributorily negligent and that an ordinar:;,
prudent truck repairman would not have relied upon the
representations of the defendant that the oil delivered
was 200 Kendall SAE 140. The Court however submitted
the question to the jury and on the proposition the jury
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answered that a prudent truck repairman would have
relied upon it being the kind of oil that it was represented to be on the barrel and by the invoices and delivery slips.
Group 5 of the special verdict contained two propositions which read as follows:
"Proposition (a) The said damage to the
trucks would have occurred with the use of 200
Kendall SAE 140 oil.
"Proposition (b) The said damage would not
have occurred to the said trucks with the use of
200 Kendall SAE 140 oil."
The jury answered the propo.sition that the damage that
occurred to the trucks would not have occurred had the
oil furnished by defendant been :200 Kendall SAE 140 oil.
The evidence supporting this finding was the expert
testinwny of the plaintiff and a nu1nber of pamphlets
both supplied by plaintiff and supplied by the defendant.
Exhibit 8 was a che1nical lubrication 1nanual put out by
J(endall Refining C01npany, one of the exhibits furnished
hy defendant. Exhibit 11 likewise was infonnation furnished hy l{endall Refining C01npany. It was a report to
defendant showing the results of .a test which the Kendall
Hefining Company conducted on a sample of the oil furnished to it by defendant. The oil cmne fr01n the rear
end of the trucks which were lubricated by plaintiff.
The matter was considerably disputed. The evidence
\\'ouJd ~upport a finding on the plaintiff's testilnony
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alone that the Kendall 200 SAE 140 oil was .an oil which
would satisfactorily lubricate the kind of truck rear ends
into which it was placed.
The last group of the special verdict submitted to
the jury was on the an1ount of damages suffered and
apparently defendant has no objection to the amount of
the verdict or the 1nanner of said question being submitted to the jury.

The testi1nony of plaintiff revealed that over a long
period of time he had purchased from defendant Kendall
200 SAE 140 gear lubricant and that on prior occasions
he had requested the oil to be delivered in 100 pound
cans. That on occasion in the past the oil had been placed
in .said cans by defendant out of larger barrels which he
had at his place of business.
The oil can itself was an exhibit before the jury.
It was carefully examined and viewed by all of the parties, the Court and the jury.
There was no seal on the can. Defendant would lead
the Court to believe that the can was a sealed container.
Not so. It was an ordinary type c.an with a crimped edge,
the crimps around the edge being of the kind which could
be opened with a pair of pliers and closed in the same
manner. There was no other kind of seal which could not
be removed and replaced by any person who had the
occasion to do so without leaving any sign of his activity.
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Contrary to the statement contained in defendant's
brief, defendant testified that he could not say who had
handled the barrel of oil while it was in his possession
or how long it had been there. (R. 133 and 134)
The record also reveals that the defendant was in the
business of reprocessing oil, re-refining oil and that he
acts as a wholesaler of such oil. (R. 127)
Defendant would not deny that at his place of business he had on occasion filled these kind of cans which
had been delivered to plaintiff and represented to contain
l{endall 200 SAE 140 gear lubricant. (R. 128)
A sample of the oil which was in the rear end of the
trucks repaired by plaintiff was furnished by plaintiff
to defendant. Defendant then sub1nitted the sample oil
to the Kendall Refining Cmnpany. A report on the submitted oil w.as 1nade to defendant and becan1e Exhibit 11.
The report as far as material to the present appeal states
as follows:
"This is in follow-up of ~Ir. Osborne's letter
to you of February 10. \Ye receiYed the sample
of gear lubricant, taken frmn one of the Eaton,
1nodel :28.M, dual, double reduction rear axle .assenlblies frmn an unit owned and operated by The
Air & Eng-ine ~erYire Cmnpany.
''Our laboratory report, nu1nber 3(ll3G, found
the gear lube smnple to be an SAE 90 EP Gear
Lubricant with a viscositY index of onlY 89.6. In
other word:-;, the san1ple ~ub1nitted to ~s was not
rr>presentatiYP of Kendall No. 200 Gear Lube,
whieh had been reported as having been used in
the above n1entioned rear axle.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Exhibit 1~ is a C'opy of the letter forwarded hy defendant to l(endall Refining Company requesting a testing of the sample of lubricant submitted to Kendall.
At the ti1ne of trial defendant did not disavow the
letter. It was identified by defendant and was submitted
for the jury's consideration.
Sl'l\C\fARY OF

ARGU~IENT

POINT I
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS PROPERLY PLACED
THE BURDEN OF PROVING CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE UPON DEFENDANT.
POINT II
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
CONCERNING THE WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABLE
QUALITY.
POINT III
EXHIBIT NO. 11 WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED AND IS
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WHI·CH COULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE JURY.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS PROPERLY PLACED
THE BURDEN OF PROVING CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE UPON DEFENDANT.

The Court in Instruction No. 2 placed upon plaintiff
the burden of proving the truth of the propositions letter
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(a) in groups 1, 2 and 3 of the special verdict. It required
plaintiff to prove, first, that the defendant sold to plaintiff oil which was not 200 Kendall SAE 140. Second, that
the plaintiff used the oil furnished in reliance on the
representations of defendant that it was 200 Kendall SAE
140. Third, that the oil was the cause of damage to the
trucks in which it was used.
These three propositions are the basic and fundaInental issues of plaintiff's cause of action. The Court, by
instruction X o. 2, required defendant to prove the affirmative propositions lettered (a) groups 4 and 5. These
propositions required that he prove that under the conditions of sale and purchase of the oil an ordinarily prudent truck repairman would not have relied on the oil as
being 200 Kendall SAE 140. This defense would be a defense of contributory negligence. It would seen1 clear
that the burden of proving contributory negligence as in
all case of tort liability, would be upon the defendant. If
an ordinarily prudent truck repainnan would not have
relied upon the representations and warranty then plaintiff would have been negligent.
Proposition 5 was that the da1nage to the trucks
would have occurred even had the oil used been 200 l{endall SA I·~ 1-t-0 oil. The burden of proving this propo:-;ition "·a~ likewi8e placed upon the defendant.
The .argument of defendant as contained on pages
9, 10, 11 and 12 of his brief seem to go to a basic factual
propo:-;ition. He argues that reliance must be established
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by evidence. vVith this plaintiff has no argument. The
Court placed the burden of proving reliance on plaintiff,
and the burden of showing unreasonableness of such
reliance on defendant. The evidence is substantial. The
arguments are resolved by the jury rendering its verdict upon the preponderance of the evidence as it viewed
it. Witness Petty, an expert on testing of oil stated he
could not, hy looking at the oil tell its SAE equivalent.
(R. 20)
The defense is that no reasonably prudent person
would have believed that the oil furnished was X o. 200
Kendall SAE 140 oil. That plaintiff, in relying upon
the representation that it was such oil was acting as an
unreasonable person. Defendant did not plead contributory negligence. He denied that the plaintiff relied
upon their representation that the oil furnished

\\'a~

X o.

200 Kendall SAE 140.
Throughout the trial, without objection, evidence was
received and the instruction was given concerning contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. The
burden of proving it was upon the defendant. Defendant
seemed to .admit that if he pleaded contributory negligence he would have the burden of proving it. Certainly
the permitting of such defense though not pleaded should
not now be claimed by defendant as a way to shift the
burden of proving freedom from contributory negligence
to plain tiff.
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POINT II
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
CONCERNING THE WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABLE
QUALITY.

As plaintiff analyses the position of defendant concerning the warranty, it is to the effect that since the oil
'vas delivered in a container which defendant claims was
a sealed container there was no warranty.
The law of Utah seerns to be clear that the kind of
lid which was on the can in which the oil was delivered,
namely, a crirnped edge lid with the crirnps fitting into the
corresponding indentations on the can, does not, as that
terrn is used in sales law, create nor constitute a sealed
container. Jordan v. Coke Cola Bottling Company of
Utah, 117 Utah 578, 218 P. 2d 660.
The provisions of the sales act under which plaintiff
views his clairn is 61-1-15 ( 2). It reads as follows:
"\Yhere the goods are bought by description
frorn a seller who deals in goods of that description (whether he is the grower or rnanufacturer or
not), there is an irnplied warranty that the goods
shall be of merchantable quality.··
The provision of the sales act has been considered
at great length h~, the authorities since the uniform sales
act was adopted. It has been generally recognized that
the quoted portion, as far as liability for the sale of
good~ whieh were not of rnerchantable quality is con<'Prned, ha~ abolished the distinction between a dealer and
a manufaehtrPr of the goods sold.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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.Merchantable quality has been described as bein:s
at least aver.age quality. It has been said that it mean"
that the goods sold are of the general kind described and
reasonably fit for the general purpose for ·which it shall
have been sold. Giant J/({}mfact~trin/J Co. v. rates .American Jlaclz iue·ry Co., 111 Fed. 2d 3GO. Botti v. F enice
Grocery Co., 309 ~las~. -±50, :~3 .:\E :2cl-±91, 135 ALR 1387.
S]JPIT.1f Flo·ur Co. v. De;1!oss, 11-± Or. 4-W, 18 P. :Z(l :2-±:2,
90 ALR 406.
There could be no doubt that a warranty of Inerchantahilit:- would require of the seller that the goods actually be those which were ordered by the huyer. In the
present case it is demonstrated that the oil furnished
was not Kendall 200 SAE 140 oil. Certainly .a warranty
of merchantability would require that the seller supply
the actual kind of oil ordered and not just that oil be
furnished which is branded as the oil ordered.
Probably the leading authority concerning this matter in the State of rtah is TVri,r;ht r. llozrell, -t-6 rtah 3SS,
150 Pac. 956. In the case the lm~-er requested raw linseed oil and the seller furnished instead boiled lin~wed
oil. It was held that the seller was responsiblP for the
death of the horses to which the boiled linseed oil wa~
administered.
The most recent Utah case discussing the matter of
warranty is vVasatch Chemical Co. v. Lerm, ______ Utah
______ , 259 Pac. 2d 301, at 303. See also Thatcher Jlf i11i ll.rJ
Elevator Co. v. Cambell, 64 Utah -1-22, 231 Pac. G21.
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It appears that under Utah decisions the container
was not a sealed container and even if it were so a warranty would still exi~t in favor of the buyer that the
goods delivered in a sealed container were of merchantable quality, i.e., that they were actually the goods which
the seller ordered and which the brand or description on
the container described.
POINT III
EXHIBIT NO. 11 WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED AND IS
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WHICH COULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE JURY.

The general rule cited by the evidence text writers is
to the effect that letter received or written by a party
to a law suit may be received as competent evidence.
Such documents are received as admissions against interest or adoptive admission. When a party to a law
suit has received a letter, retained it, acted upon it, furnished copies of it to other persons, or has requested the
writer to make the report. The receipt, possession, reliance upon and use of such letters is Yiewed as an acquiesence in the letters content.
For a discussion of such rules see Jones. On Evidence. \'olu1ne 1. Section 269, Page 504.
The

te~t imony

n~<'eiverl I~xhihit

:-;nlt of a

of 0. C. Allen rev-ealed that he had

No. 11. It "·as written to hiln as a re-

n•<pw~t h~·

hiln for a test of the oil furnished.

Jlp rPlie<l upon it anrl.a<'qniPsce in its content. He did not
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make any kind of a protest to the l{:endall people, did
not make any clain1 that the content of the letter was not
accurate or that the test did not reveal a true condition
as far ,as the oil is concerned.
The exhibit is material on the question of merchantability. Defendant was required to furnish plaintiff only
oil representative of Kendall 200 SAE 140 oil. The Kendall letter shows that the oil was not a representative
sample of I\::endall No. 200 SAE 140 oil.
The Eniforrn Rules of Evidence approved by the
American Bar Association and adopted as a Preliminary
Draft by the Utah State Bar Commission sets down the
rule contended for by plaintiff in the following language,
Rule 62 He.arsay Evidence Sub-rule 8:

"A 1dhorized and Ado }Jtive Admissions. "'\-,
against a party, a stateinent (a) by a person authorized by the part~~ to n1ake a statement or statements for him concerning the subject of the statement, or (b) of which the party with knowledge of
the content thereof has, b~r words or other condurt,
manifested his adoption or his belief in its truth.''
The basic proposition which plaintiff contends for
is discussed at great length by Wigmore in his work on
evidence. See Wigmore on Evidence, Volume+, Section
1073, Page 89. The basic rule as set forth rPa(ls as fol-

lows:
"The written statements of a third person
may be so dealt with by the party that his assent
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to the correctness of the statements may be inferred, and they would thus by adoption become
his own statements."
Wigmore discusses the docurnents which have been
received in many cases as admissions against the party
to whom they were addressed under the following basic
classifications : (1) Documents seen. ( 2) Documents
found in possession; (3) Documents of demand received
hut not answered; and ( 4) Documents made use of. The
discussion under the fourth category, namely, documents
1nade use of, seems to be rnost clearly applicable to the
discussion found current in this Court. The general rule
under four is as follows:
"The parties use of a document rnade by .a
third person will frequently amount to a approval
of its statements as correct and thus it n1ay be
received against him as an admission by adoption." p. 97.
In JJfonsos v. Eiler, et al., 216 'Yis. 133, 256 X.,Y. 630

the receipt by the trial court of an unsigned carbon of a
letter frmu an insurance agency written to the insurance
agent of the plaintiff was approved. The insurance
agent sent a ropy of this letter to the defendant. The
defendant took the letter .and delivered it to the plaintiff.
'T'he IC'ttPr contained a statement that the defendant felt
very had about the happening of the accident and felt
that he wa.s to blaine sinre he had invited the plaintiff
to ride with hiln. The 'Visconsin Court held that the
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delivery of the unsigned copy of the letter by the defendant to the plaintiff, without repudiation of its content, constitute an adoption of the contents of the letter.
In Wieder v. Lorenz, 164 Or. 10, 99 Pac. 2d 38, the
Oregon Suprmne Court upheld the Trial Court in permitting a letter from defendant's bank. The bank was not
a party nor did not appear to be the agent of the defendant for the purpose of communicating or writing a letter,
however, the letter was written to the defendant and in
it there was discussed certain logs which were referred
to as the property of the defendant. Inquiries were made
concerning the .sale or use of the proceeds from the logs.
The Court held that the receipt of the letter and its retention without repudiating the truth of the content therein
and without stating that what was set forth therein was
not a fact constituted an admission by the defendant that
the bank had a correct understanding of the ownership
of the property which it wrote about. This case is an
example of a party dealing with written instruments of a
third person in such a way as to show that he adopted
the document and acquiesed in the contents.
In People v. Burgess, 244 N.Y. 472, 155 N.E. 7--l-fl, the
New York Appellate Court held that the receipt of auditors report without the auditor who prepared them testifying was proper as an admission by the defendant where
counsel for the defendant had submitted the .auditor';.;;
report to the Grand Jury at a time when defendant's case
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was being considered by the Grand Jury. This case is
another exarnple of the third party statement being so
used, handled or relied upon as to constitute an admission.
One of the most interesting cases is Cameron v. Cameron, 232 N".C. 686, 61 S.E. 2d 913. This was a divorce
action and there were certain letters received as evidence
against the party to whom they were written. The letters
were found in the private desk of the party and contained
compromising state1nents from persons to whom the lady
had been writing. The Court held that the retention by
the party of the letters fron1 the third party and her
claim to said letters constituted an assent to the content
and acquiescence in the content of the letter. As a consequence the letters were admissible evidence in the divorce action to show that she was guilty of misconduct
and breach of her marital vows.
In Commonworth v. Fusci, 153 Pa. Super 617, 35 Atl.
2d 93, p. 96 the rules set forth in Wigmore are specifically
approved, the case concerned a letter received but not
replied to and acted upon. The Court held that the reeipient of the letter had adopted and approved its content.
Exhibit 11

w.a~

a response to an inquiry and request

for tlw testing utade hy the defendant and in making the
h\st and reporting its results l{endall acted for defendant.
'1-,he Pxhihi t di reetl~·

statf'~

that the l{endall Oil Com pan~~
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was not responsible for that oil because it was not their
brand of oil and w.as not representative of their 200 SAE
140 oil.
If the defendant disbelieved the letter should such
a statement b:, I{endall go unchallenged~ There would
logically have been smne response to Kendall's statement
if it were not conceded to be true. The explanation for
his failure to respond would lie in defendant 'f-; mouth.
If he desired to explain the letter or to show what he had
done in response to it other than deliver a copy to the
plaintiff he should have come forward with such evidence.
If his counsel desired to have the use of the letters by the
jury controlled to request an instruction concerning its
request was his responsibility.
In Yolume 20, American J urisprudencr .at page 481
and 482 there is n discussion of the evidentiary rule under topic heading ··l~ailure to Answer vVritten Communication" and under the heading "Silence Re~;l>etting Accident." Both of these sections discuss the rules which
we have cited to the Court in Wigmore and Jones under
the heading "Tacit Admission hy a Party."
The closest case which counsel for plaintiff has been
to discover in the State o;· Utah is the State v.
Greene) 38 Utah 389, 115 Pac. 181. In the Green case
there was an affidavit by the prosecuting witness. The
affidavit was received to show .admissions by the defendant of a pnrt of the affidavit. It was admitted over thP
objection that the affidavit was hearsay. Defendant had
aLlr~
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been exmnined concerning statements in the affidavit of
the prosecuting witne.ss by the county attorney and his
reaction and admission that certain of the statements
made in the affidavit were true constituted the grounds
for its admission even though hearsay.
It is respectfully submitted that the Exhibit 11 was

properly received as evidence in the above entitled action.
Certainly the conduct of the defendant regarding the
exhibit showed tacit admission, acquiescence in, and adoption of the report which he had requested from the Kendall Oil Company and which was made for him by the
company.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully sub1nitted that the Court did not
error in its instructions; that it did not error in the re~
ception of the evidence received. The verdict of the jury
is supported by substantial evidence and the amount
awarded plaintiff is a fair sun1 for the damages suffered.
This Court should therefore affirn1 the judg1nent of tlw
Lower Court.
Respectfully subn1itted,

KING AND HUGHES
By Dwight L.

I~ing
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